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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATE OF UTAH t 
Case No. 
vs. ) 10596 
LA,VRENCE R. SEYl\IOUR, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Lawrence R. Seymour, appeals 
from his conviction upon jury trial in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District for the crime of attempt-
ing to obtain money by false pretenses in violation of 
Section 76-1-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The appellant was charged by complaint with the 
crime of attempting to obtain money by false pretenses. 
After several continuances, he appeared before the City 
I 
Court of Salt Lake City without counsel and waived 
preliminary hearing, after which he was bound over to 
district court. At the time of his appearance in the 
district court, he was represented by counsel, entered a 
plea of not guilty, whereupon a full trial was held on the 
charge and the appellant was found guilty. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits that the facts are ade· 
quately set forth in the appellant's brief. However, 
respondent would like to call to the court's attention 
the fact that no motion was apparently made at the time 
of the appellant's arraignment in district court to re-
mand the case to the city court for the purposes of a 
preliminary hearing. Further, counsel for the appellant 
in no way indicated that he was prejudiced or unpre-
pared because of a failure to have a preliminary hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO QUASH THE INFORMATION AND 
2 
THE MOTION FOR NE'V TRIAL ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT THE APPELLANT WAS 
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AT 
THE TIME OF PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
SINCE A PRELIMINARY HEARING IS 
NOT A CRITICAL STAGE REQUIRING 
THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, AND 
THE RECORD APPEARS TO SUBSTANTI-
ATE THAT THE APPELLANT 'VAIVED 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
The only issue raised on appeal by the appellant 
is whether a preliminary hearing is a critical stage that 
requires the appointment of counsel. It appears from 
the transcript of proceedings in the city court that the 
appellant appeared in the City Court of Salt Lake 
City on December 3, 1965, and did waive preliminary 
hearing (R. 3). If the affidavit of Mr. Hisatake is to 
be believed, he was not present, and the transcript 
indicates that he was not present, since it states that the 
appellant was present without counsel. Consequently, 
the only question is whether there is an absolute require-
ment to counsel at the time of preliminary hearing. If 
there is no such absolute requirement, then the trial court 
was correct in denying the motion to quash the inf orma-
tion. Respondent further contends that the trial court 
acted in accordance with law in denying the motion for 
a new trial since it was not timely filed. 
Section 77-38-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
Yides that a motion for new trial must be served and 
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filed within five days after the rendition of the verdict 
or decision. The decision in the instant case was rendered 
on November 5, 1965, and the motion for new trial was 
not filed until November 15, 1965. Consequently, the 
only question is whether the trial court erred in not 
granting the motion to quash the information on the 
grounds of a lack of preliminary hearing. Since the 
transcript indicates that preliminary hearing was waived, 
there is no evidence to contradict the fact that a prelimi· 
nary hearing was offered to the appellant and he did, 
in fact, waive it. Further, no motion to remand for a 
preliminary hearing was made. The only question, there· 
fore, is whether appellant had a constitutional right to 
have counsel appointed, although he apparently waived 
preliminary hearing. 
Appellant has framed as the sole issue in his brief 
on appeal the question of whether under recent decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court a preliminary 
hearing is such a critical stage as to require the appoint· 
ment of counsel. The appellant points to three decisions 
from the United States Supreme Court to justify his 
position. 
The first is Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
This case merely laid down the rule that in a capital 
case a state must provide counsel for an indigent defend· 
ant. Nowhere in the Powell case did the court rule that 
counsel was essential at a preliminary hearing. 
In the second case cited by the appellant, Hamilton 
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 ( 1961), the United States 
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Supreme Court held that under Alabama procedure 
the arraignment was a "critical stage" which required 
the appointment of counsel. That case is substantially 
different from the instant case, since the appellant does 
not contend that he was denied counsel at the time of 
his arraignment but at the time of preliminary hearing. 
Further, the Supreme Court noted that under Alabama 
procedure, if a defense of insanity or various special 
motions were to be brought to the court's attention, 
that they would have to have been plead at the time 
of arraignment or thereafter lost. There is no require-
ment that a defendant enter any plea or raise any 
defense at the time of preliminary hearing under Utah 
procedure upon penalty that if he fails to do so he will 
be foreclosed from raising the defense. The Hamilton 
case in no way considered the question of necessity of 
counsel at preliminary hearing. 
Finally, the appellant cites the case of White v. 
ill aryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). In this case, the defend-
ant contended that the failure to give him counsel at 
the time of preliminary hearing was a violation of his 
constitutional rights. The argument was based upon the 
fact that at the time of preliminary hearing under Mary-
land procedure, the defendant entered a plea of guilty. 
Thereafter, before the dictrict court, after being bound 
over, he entered a plea of not guilty. At the time of his 
trial, his plea of guilty at the time of preliminary hear-
ing could be used against him as an admission against 
his interest which resulted in his conviction. The United 
States Supreme Court ruled that since at the time of 
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preliminary hearing, a plea could be entered which could 
later be used against the defendant at the time of trial, 
the preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" requiring 
the appointment of counsel. This case is, of course, sub-
stantially different than the issue now before the court. 
Under Utah procedure, no plea is entered at the time 
of preliminary hearing. In the instant case, there is no 
evidence that anything was said at the time of the 
appearance before Judge Beck where the appellant 
waived preliminary hearing that was used against him 
at the time of trial. Consequently, the decision in White 
v. Maryland, supra, is not material to the present fact 
situation. Further, in the present fact situation, there 
was no motion to remand the case for additional pre· 
liminary hearing nor any showing that the absence of 
a preliminary hearing in any way prejudiced the appel· 
lant's position. In addition, appellant here was afforded 
a full trial on his plea of not guilty, was represented by 
counsel, and convicted only upon the evidence offered to 
the jury. 
The same issue raised in this case which was before 
the court in State v. Bransch, 119 Utah 550, 229 P.2d 
289 ( 1951 ) . In that case, this court noted that: 
"The preliminary hearing is an inquiry, not 
a trial. It is held in the place of the common law 
grand jury where the accused is only present if 
called as a witness and is never represented by 
counsel." 
The court in the Braasch case further noted that at the 
preliminary hearing there was no prejudice to the de· 
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fendant from the failure to have counsel. This court 
determined that there could be no prejudice to the 
defendants where they had a full trial subsequent to 
appearing at preliminary hearing without counsel. There 
is no reason to depart from the Braasch rule. 
Recently, courts have generally recognized that a 
preliminary hearing is not a critical stage within the 
meaning of Hamilton and White. 
In DeToro v. Peppersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 
1964), a state prisoner sought a petition of writ of 
habeas corpus from a federal court. The matter came 
before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court 
ruled that under Maryland law, as modified since the 
'Vhite decision, that a preliminary hearing was not a 
critical stage of judicial process and that defenses not 
raised were not irretrievably lost. Therefore, the failure 
to appoint counsel for the accused charged with murder 
did not violate his constitutional right to counsel. The 
court stated: 
"Despite the very able arguments advanced by 
counsel for DeToro, we are unable to accept 
either of these contentions. 'Ve take as our start-
ing point, as do the parties, Powell v. Alabama, 
supra, which states the broad proposition that an 
accused has the right to counsel 'at every step in 
the proceedings against him.' 287 U.S. at 69, 
53 S.Ct. at 64. In Powell, this was taken to mean 
that the accused has the right to have counsel 
appointed sufficiently in advance of trial to 
make adequate preparation. Later decisions of 
the Court have reaffirmed the importance of pre-
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trial preparation. In Avery v. Alabama, 308 
U.S. 444, Mr. Justice Black warned that: 
'[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed 
counsel to confer, to consult with the accused 
and to prepare his defense, could convert the 
appointment of counsel into a sham and noth-
ing more than a formal compliance with the 
Constitution's requirement that an accused be 
given the assistance of counsel. The Constitu-
tion's guarantee of assistance of counsel can-
not be satisfied by mere formal appointment.' 
While Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, and 
White v. Maryland, supra, have further ex-
tended the right to counsel prior to trial, we are 
unable to read them as extending that right to 
the extent and in the manner urged by DeToro. 
In Hamilton, the defendant, indicted for burg- ' 
lary, and without counsel, entered a plea of not 
guilty at arraignment. The Supreme Court re-
versed his later conviction, holding that the de-
fendant had been entitled to counsel, since, under 
Alabama law, arraignment is 'a critical stage in 
a criminal proceeding.' 368 U.S. at 53, 82 S.Ct. 
at 158. It was a critical stage, according to the 
Court, because certain defenses, specifically a 
plea of insanity, a plea in abatement, and a 
motion to quash based on an improperly drawn 
grand jury, not raised at arraignment, were con-
sidered waived. 
In White, the accused was without counsel at 
a preliminary hearing. Unlike arraignment under 
Alabama law, a preliminary hearing under Mary-
land law is not, in and of itself, a critical stage 
in the judicial process. Defenses not raised at a 
preliminary hearing are not irretrievably lost 
and may be raised later. In the context of the 
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particular facts of White, however, the Court 
was persuaded that White's preliminary hearing 
had been a critical stage. This was so because 
White's plea of guilty, taken at the preliminary 
hearing and subsequently withdrawn, was intro-
duced into evidence against him during trial. On 
this ground, the Court reversed the conviction. 
DeToro calls our attention to what he con-
siders to be the key sentence of the case: 
'For petitioner entered a plea before the 
magistrate and that plea was taken at a time 
when he had no counsel.' 373 U.S. at 60, 83 
S.Ct. 1051. 
The district court, we think, effectively brought 
the above sentence into the proper perspective: 
'This sentence cannot be read out of context. 
It must relate to the case before the Court, 
namely that the "plea" was "guilty," and it 
was offered in evidence at the trial.' 222 F. 
Supp. at 624. 
In our view, Hamilton and White teach that 
an accused is denied rights afforded him under 
the sixth amendment when he is subjected to an 
arraignment or to a preliminary hearing without 
the assistance of counsel, where events transpire 
that are likely to prejudice his ensuing trial. The 
court, in each case, refused to speculate as to 
whether in fact prejudice actually accrued. 
Thus, the thrust of Powell's admonition that 
an accused has a right to counsel 'at every step in 
the proceedings against him,' as borne out by 
subsequent decisions, including Hamilton and 
White, seems to be that if the effectiveness of 
legal assistance ultimately furnished an accused 
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is likely to be prejudiced by its prior denial, the 
earlier period may be deemed a critical stage in 
the judicial process and a conviction obtained in 
such circumstances is rendered invalid. We find 
nothing in the Supreme Court decisions, however, 
that would permit us to extend the duty of the 
State to appoint counsel in proceedings where 
even the likelihood of later prejudice arising from 
the failure to appoint is absent." 
It should be noted that the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Latham v. Crause, 
320 F.2d 120 (1963), handed down subsequent to both 
\Vhite and Hamilton, ruled that an accused has no con-
stitutional right to be furnished counsel at a preliminary 
hearing in a state court capital case. In that case, two 
individuals by the names of Latham and York were 
responsible for a series of killings throughout the United 
States, and were tried and convicted of murder in 
Kansas after being apprehended in Utah. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on its previous decision 
in Utah v. Sullivan, 227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1952). It 
stated: 
"The first contention is that petitioners were 
entitled to have counsel appointed for them prior 
to the preliminary examination. l-Ieavy reliance 
is placed on the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainright, Correc-
tions Director, 372 U.S. 385, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 
L.Ed. 2d 799. That case concerned the right of 
an accused to counsel at trial - not a preliminary 
hearing. In State of Utah v. Sullivan, 10 Cir., 
227 F.2d 511, 513, certiorari denied, sub nom. 
Braasch v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973, 76 S.Ct. 449, 
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100 L.Ed. 844, we held that in circumstances 
where an accused did not enter a plea of guilty 
at a preliminary hearing, did not make a con-
fession, did not testify and did not say anything 
of an incriminating nature, the failure to furnish 
counsel at such hearing did not abridge the ac-
cused's fundamental constitutional rights. That 
decision is controlling here. No claim is made of 
any incriminating statements or acts of nation. 
All they did was to waive the right to a prelimi-
nary hearing. Prejudice is asserted on the ground 
that counsel would have forced the prosecution 
to disclose at least some of its evidence. The point 
is not well taken as more than a month in advance 
of trial copies of the confessions and lists of the 
prosecution witnesses were given defense counsel. 
Our conclusions in State of Utah v. Sullivan are 
supported _by the decisions of other circuits. We 
find nothing in Gideon v. Wainright which re-
quires a review of the decision in State of Utah 
v. Sullivan." 
Further, most recently, in Loato v. Cux, 344 F.2d 
916 (10th Cir. 1965), the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in a per curiam opinion adhered to the position 
noted above. The court observed that the preliminary 
proceedings were entirely independent of the prisoner's 
formal arraignment and sentencing, and at the time 
of preliminary hearing, the prisoner was not prejudiced. 
In the Loato case, the defendant appeared before a 
justice of the peace without counsel and thereafter, at 
the time of arraignment, entered a plea of guilty. The 
court concluded that the defendant was m no way 
deprived of any constitutional right. 
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A similar case is United States v. Rundle, 349 F.2d 
952 (3rd Cir. 1965). 
In Vol. II, No. 4, of the Def ender News Letter 
' 
July 6, 1965, there is an excellent discussion of the right 
to counsel at preliminary hearing. It is noted: 
"Some courts have understood the White case 
to mean that the absence of counsel at the pre-
liminary hearing is not a violation of the defend-
ant's constitutional rights, if the absence of coun-
sel is not, in the eyes of the court, prejudicial." 
Thus, in People v. Daniels, 199 N.E.2d 33 
(Ill. App. 1964), an Illinois appellate court saw 
~o deprivation of the accused's right to counsel, 
since: 
'there is neither a claim or any showing that 
the absence of counsel at the preliminary hear· 
ing or a failure of an earlier appointment of 
counsel in any manner prejudiced the defend· 
ant or in any way adversely affected or con· 
taminated the subsequent proceedings in the 
case'." 
The same newsletter notes: 
"Other courts have found there to be no con· 
stitutional injury in the failure to appoint coun· 
sel where no plea offered at the preliminary hear· 
ing could be offered in evidence at the trial***." 
In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reineke, 333 
F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1964), a United States Court of 
Appeals reasoned that the preliminary hearing in Con· 
necticut could not be deemed a critical stage. The court 
stated: 
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"The Connecticut hearing in probable cause 
has been accurately characterized as a mere 'in-
quest' made to determine the existence of prob-
able cause, and to discharge the accused if none 
exist ***. The finding of probable cause is not 
final and it cannot be used against the accused 
on trial before the superior court. *** 
The Connecticut hearing in probable cause 
cannot, therefore, be characterized as critical as 
in the arraignment in Alabama. Indeed, it can 
hardly be termed a proceeding against the ac-
cused. To the contrary, it appears to operate 
entirely for the accused's benefit. And the mere 
fact that an accused is required to plead does not, 
in itself, demand the contrary conclusion where 
the plea entered is a self-serving denial of guilt. 
At trial, appellant had every opportunity to 
present any events that was available initially." 
Further, in Freeman v. State, 392 P.2d 542 (Ida. 
1964), the Supreme Court of Idaho stated: 
"While it is recognized that an accused has a 
right to counsel at every s).:age of the proceedings, 
we do not understand this to mean that he must 
be so represented in the preliminary processes 
which take place primarily for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether a crime has been committed 
and whether there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the accused has committed it, and 
particularly, where no prejudice has befallen 
him." 
Numerous decisions from other courts from other 
states support the proposition urged in this brief. 
Thus, in Montgornery v. State, 176 So.2d 331 (Fla. 
1965 ) , the court ruled that a preliminary hearing was 
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not a critical stage in Florida. Defendant had not been 
informed of his right to counsel at arraignment before 
the magistrate on preliminary hearing. 
In State v. Cox, 193 Kan. 571, 396 P.2d 326 ( 1964), 
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the lack of rep· 
resentation by counsel at the time of preliminary hear-
ing did not violate the constitutional rights of the de-
fendant who did not request appointment and made no 
claim that there was any particular prejudice at the 
time of his trial from the failure to have counsel at the 
time of preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court of 
Kansas cited the Tenth Circuit case in Latham v. 
Crause, supra, and indicated that the purpose of a pre· 
liminary hearing in Kansas was comparable to that in 
Utah in that it was an inquiry to determine probable 
cause and nothing more. 
A similar result was reached by the New Mexico 
Supreme Court in French v. Cox, 74 N.M. 593, 396 
P.2d 423 (1964). 
In State v. Jackson, 400 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1964), 
the Washington Supreme Court indicated that the right 
to counsel extends only to critical stages in the judicial 
process and that the critical point is to be determined 
both from the nature of the proceeding and from what 
actually occurs. The court there found that the prelimi· 
nary hearing was not a trial in the sense that one could 
be found guilty, but was a mere inquest made to de· 
termine the existence of probable cause; and that since 
nothing that occurred at the preliminary hearing could 
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be used against the defendant, it was not a critical stage 
which would warrant the appointment of counsel. The 
court carefully distinguished the Hamilton and White 
cases on the same basis that other cases heretofore cited 
and discussed have distinguished their application. 
A similar result was reached again by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Blacksmith, 194 
Kan. 643, 400 P .2d 7 43 ( 1965) . In that case, the court 
further held [referring to a previous Kansas case]: 
"That any so-called alleged 'irregularity' per-
taining to a preliminary examination is deemed 
to be waived where a defendant enters a voluntary 
plea of guilty in the district court." 
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Schu-
macher, 97 Ariz. 354, 400 P .2d 584 ( 1965) , also reached 
the same conclusions as the New Mexico and Kansas 
courts. Further, the Arizona court relied upon the deci-
sion of the Nevada Supreme Court in Application of 
Hoff, 393 P.2d 619 (Nev. 1964). Thus, almost every 
state surrounding Utah has adopted the position that 
this court recognized in the case of State v. Braasch, 
supra. 
In Poris v. State, 195 Kan. 313, 403 P.2d 959 
(1965), the Kansas Supreme Court ruled again that 
an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to be 
furnished court-appointed counsel at his preliminary 
hearing. 
A similar result was reached in the decision of 
State v. Atkins, 195 Kan. 182, 403 P.2d 962 (1965). 
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The appellant cites the decision of the PennsyJ. 
vania Supreme Court in Butler v. Rundle, 206 A.2d 
283 (Penn. 1965) . This decision does not support the 
appellant's position. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
concluded that a preliminary hearing was not a critical 
stage requiring the appointment of counsel for an in· 
digent defendant. The quotation in the appellant's brief 
is not from the majority opinion. Pennsylvania also 
reached the same result in James v. Russell, 207 A.2d 
792 (Pa. 1965). 
The Ohio Court in Bussey v. Maxwell, 202 N.E. 
2d 698 (Ohio 1964), ruled that a preliminary hearing 
was not a critical stage where its only purpose was in 
determining whether the defendant should be held for 
arraignment in the court of general jurisdiction. The 
Ohio court has most recently reached the same result in 
Tabor v. Maxwell, 209 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1965). 
Thus, the overwhelming majority of states have 
reached the conclusion that a preliminary hearing under 
the procedure comparable to that existing in Utah is 
not a critical stage, warranting the appointment of 
counsel. See The Preliminary Hearing - An I nteresl 
Analysis, 51 Iowa L.Rev. 164, p. 169 (1965). All the 
states surrounding the State of Utah have apparently 
reached the same conclusion. The position urged by the 
appellant is not only contrary to previous Utah prece· 
dent, but is contrary to the great majority of states and 
is a distinct minority position. It may be that under 
particular fact situations, it could be said that the failure 
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to provide counsel at preliminary hearing would be a 
denial of a constitutional right, but in the instant case 
there is no showing that any adverse statement was made 
by the appellant or that he was in any particular pre-
judice. Although the appellant argues that prejudice 
need not necessarily be shown in a case involving a 
violation of constitutional rights, this statement is an 
overly broad conclusion, since the United States Su-
preme Court has noted that in certain cases, the question 
of prejudice determines whether a critical stage has 
been reached. 
The appellant's reliance upon the recent decisions 
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and MM-
siah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), is misplaced. 
Both of these cases involve situations where in the ab-
sence of counsel, confessions were obtained. This is not 
the case in the instant situation. The preliminary hear-
ing resulted in absolutely no prejudice to the defendant. 
The respondent is aware of no case in which the United 
States Supreme Court has held that the failure to have 
counsel at the time of an interrogation where no con-
fession or any admission is obtained against the interest 
of a defendant violates his constitutional rights and 
results in a vitiation of the conviction. Further, both of 
these cases are directed to the discouragement of particu-
lar abusive police practices, which is not the situation 
in the instant case. 
It therefore is respectfully submitted that the trial 
court acted properly in ruling that preliminary hearing 
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was not a critical stage and that the defendant could 
waive the right to counsel and that the absence of coun-
sel would not result in a vitiation of his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue in the instant case seems to be one that 
has been decided by the overwhelming majority of states 
adverse to the position urged by the appellant on appeal. 
It is respectfully submitted that this court should adhere 
to its position in State v. Braasch, supra, and rule that 
the failure to provide counsel at the time of appellant's 
preliminary hearing, especially where there is an indi· 
ca ti on of waiver in the record and nothing to rebut it, 
did not result in any violation of any constitutional right. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Asst. Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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